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Selected Developments in California Law
California Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Guerra: The United States
Supreme Court Upholds California's
Mandatory Job Protection For Pregnant
Workers
In California, an employer must provide job protection for an
employee who becomes pregnant.' Under the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA), an employer must provide
medically necessary disability leave of up to four months for pregnant
employees and must reinstate the employee to the same or similar
position when the employee is ready to return to work. 2 California
requires employers to grant disability leave and reinstatement for
pregnant workers even when no similar benefits are provided for
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1982). See generally id. §§ 12900-12996 (West
1982) (known as the Fair Employment and Housing Act, codifying California fair employment
law) [hereinafter FEHA]. Compare id. at § 12926(c) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1981) (the
FEHA applies to employers of 5 or more employees while Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964 applies to employers who have 15 or more employees and who are engaged in
interstate commerce).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1982). Section 12945 of the California Govern-
ment Code provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occu-
pational qualification:... (b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . To take a leave
on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; provided, such period
shall not exceed four months .... Reasonable period of time means that period
during which the female employee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions .... An employer may require any employee who
plans to take a leave pursuant to this section to give reasonable notice of the date
such leave shall commence and the estimated duration of such leave.
Id.
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other disabled workers.3 Recently, in California Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Guerra,4 California Federal Savings and Loan
Association (Cal. Fed.) challenged the validity of FEHA section
12945(b)(2) (all references to section 12945(b)(2) are to California
Government Code section 12945(b)(2)). 5 Cal. Fed. claimed Title VII
of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 19646 pre-empted7 section
12945(b)(2). s The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 9 an amend-
ment to Title VII, defines sex discrimination to include discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy and states that pregnant workers must be
treated the same as other workers for all employment purposes. 0
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, the
Supreme Court upheld the right of California, as a state, to provide
job protection for pregnant workers, even though section 12945(b)92)
gives preferential treatment to pregnant workers and provides more
extensive protection then Title VII." Part I of this note summarizes
the legal background of Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
3. Id. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12930 (West 1982) (establishing the California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission as the state agency empowered to enforce California
fair employment law). The Commission interprets section 12945(b)(2) of the California Gov-
ernment Code to require reinstatement of pregnant workers who take disability leave. In re
Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Travel Express, Case No. FEPS0-81 A7-0992sN18709
83-17 (Aug. 4, 1983).
4. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
5. Id. 107 S. Ct., at 683 (Cal. Fed. challenged the validity of California Government
Code section 12945(b)(2) because the California legislature specifically made section 12945
(b)(2) applicable to Title VII employers while the remainder of section 12945 applies only to
non-Title VII employers). California Government Code section 12945(e) states: "The provisions
of ... section [12945], except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any
employer subject to Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12945(e) (1982).
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-20003-17 (West 1981).
7. Federal pre-emption means the federal law on a given subject will control over the
state law. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 689. The pre-emption issue in California
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra arose because Congress had not completely
displaced state regulation in the area of fair employment law; therefore, a state fair employment
law consistent with federal law is valid, whereas a state law in conflict with federal law would
be pre-empted. Id. See also BLACK's LAW DicTioNARY 315 (5th ed. 1983) (definition of federal
pre-emption).
8. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
9. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981) [hereinafter PDA].
10. Id. The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" [of Title VII] include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.
Id.
11. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 693-95.
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and section 12945(b)(2) of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act. 2 The California Federal Savings & Loan Association
opinion is examined in part II.' Finally, part III discusses the legal




Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the principal
federal prohibition against employment discrimination.' 5 The purpose
of Title VII is to protect workers from discriminatory employment
practices in hiring, termination, compensation, terms of employment,
and working conditions. 16 The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) is the agency charged with enforcing Title VII
provisions. 7 The function of the EEOC is to investigate and conciliate
charges of employment discrimination. 8 When conciliation efforts
fail to bring about a settlement between the plaintiff and employer,
the EEOC issues a right to sue letter granting the plaintiff a cause
12. See infra notes 15-89 and accompanying text (discussion of legal background).
13. See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text (analysis of the California Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra opinion).
14. See infra notes 137-55 and accompanying text (discussion of the legal ramifications
of the California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra opinion).
15. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1981).
Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1) to fall or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
16. Id. See generally Gelb & Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act:
A Viable State Remedy For Employment Discrimination, 34 HAsTINGs L.J. 1055 (1983)
(comparative analysis of FEHA and Title VII) [hereinafter Gelb & Frankfurt].
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4-2000e-5 (1981).
18. Id. § 2000e-5(d) (1981). Section 2000e-5(b) states in relevant part:
If the [Equal Opportunity Employment] Commission determines after ... investi-
gation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge [of engaging in an
unlawful employment practice] is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
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of action in federal court.19 Thus, Title VII is enforced primarily
through private action.
Under Title VII there are two basic legal theories used to prove
discrimination: The disparate treatment theory, and the disparate
impact theory.20 The disparate treatment theory is designed to end
employment practices which discriminate by treating members of a
protected class differently than other employees. Disparate treatment
is evidenced by less favorable treatment of plaintiffs on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.21 In contrast, the disparate
impact theory seeks to end employment practices which treat all
employees the same, yet effect members of a protected class in a
discriminatory manner.22 Under the disparate impact theory, the
plaintiff may challenge facially neutral employment practices which
adversely impact a group identifiable by race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.? Title VII prevents two types of discriminatory
employment practices, those which discriminate in treatment and
those which discriminate in effect.
The history of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII is marked
by conflicting judicial decisions attempting to determine whether
discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy. 24 Prior to 1976, many federal circuit courts
interpreted Title VII to prevent discrimination on the basis of preg-
19. Id. § 200Oe-5(f)(1) (1981).
20. Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 1067-68.
21. Id. See also International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (recognizing disparate treatment as the most obvious type of employment discrimination
Congress intended to correct when it enacted Title VII).
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (disparate impact theory created
when plaintiff was permitted to challenge a facially neutral job requirement of a high school
diploma or standardized test, the court held the test was unrelated to job performance and
effectively screened out almost all black applicants).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Communications Workers v. A.T.&T., 513 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1975)
(disparate treatment of pregnancy related disabilities in employment violates Title VII); Wetzel
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1975) vacated on other grounds, 424
U.S. 737 (1976) (employment practices of excluding pregnancy benefits from company income
protection plan and requiring female employees to return to work three months after childbirth
or be terminated discriminatory against women in violation of Title VII); Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities from
employee disability benefit plan violates Title VII); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514
F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant's discharge of plaintiff due to temporary pregnancy
disability, when others temporarily disabled were not discharged, constituted discrimination
against pregnant women in violation of Title VII.); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist.,
519 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1975) (sick leave policy excluding pregnancy disabilities found to
violate Title VII); Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1213 (1975) (school
district policy denying sick leave pay to pregnant employees while requiring mandatory leave
of absence for pregnancy violates Tide VII).
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nancy.25 Then, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,26 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive employee disability benefit
plan which expressly excluded pregnancy from coverage.27 The Su-
preme Court held that employers could exclude pregnancy benefits
because sex discrimination under Title VII did not include classifi-
cation on the basis of pregnancy. 28 The disability benefits plan in
Gilbert divided beneficiaries into two groups: pregnant women and
non-pregnant persons. Non-pregnant persons included both men and
women. 29 Pregnancy, the court reasoned, was merely an additional
risk faced by some women, so excluding pregnancy did not discrim-
inate on the basis of sex.
30
Congress, in reaction to Gilbert, amended the definitional section
of Title VII to unequivocally state that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy is sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII.3' The
1978 amendment, known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
is made up of two clauses. The first clause includes pregnancy and
related medical conditions in the meaning of "on the basis of sex"
as used in Title VII.32 The second clause requires employers to treat
pregnant workers the same as other workers for all employment
purposes including receipt of fringe benefits. 33
The wording of the PDA is ambiguous, however, when applied to
allegations of disparate impact. The second clause of the PDA
specifies that pregnant workers be treated the same as other workers. 34
25. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (cases interpreting sex discriminination under
Title VII to include pregnancy discrimination).
26. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
27. Id. at 128. The plan in Gilbert provided benefits in the form of 60% of an employee's
normal wages for absences from work resulting from nonoccupational sickness or accident,
paid through a maximum of 26 weeks for any one period of disability. Id. The plan excluded
from coverage any absence from work as a result of pregnancy. Id.
28. Id. at 135.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 139.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). See 123 CONG. REc. S29387 (1977) (remarks of Senator
Javits). Senator Javits stated:[The PDA] does not represent a new initiative in employment
discrimination law, neither does it attempt to expand the reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 into new areas of employment relationships. Rather, this bill is simply corrective
legislation, designed to restore the law with respect to pregnant women employees to the point
where it was last year, before the Supreme Court's decision in [Gilbert]. Id. See also Note,
Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929,
930-39 (1980) (legislative history of the PDA expresses criticism of the Gilbert opinion); Krieger
& Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy; Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning
of Women's Equality, 13 GoLDmN GATE U.L. Ra-v. 513, 528-31 (1983) (discussion of the PDA as
reactionary legislation) [hereinafter Krieger & Cooney].
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). See also supra note 10 (text of PDA).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
34. Id.
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Yet, according to the disparate impact theory, treating pregnant
workers the same as other workers results in discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy. 35 The resolution of the disparate impact problem
depends on the relationship between the first and second clauses of
the PDA. If the second clause of the PDA, requiring the same
treatment for pregnant workers, is interpreted as an illustration of
how to remedy pregnancy discrimination, then pregnant workers may
maintain a disparate impact remedy under the PDA. But, if the
second clause of the PDA, is interpreted to limit the first clause,
then employers are obligated to treat pregnant workers the same as
other employees, regardless of disparate impact.
3 6
Although the language of the PDA is ambiguous, the legislative
history shows that Congress intended the PDA to function within
the framework of Title VII as a whole, preventing pregnancy dis-
crimination in both treatment and effect. 37 Congress reviewed exten-
sive evidence of employment discrimination against pregnant workers
in the United States. 38 Congress was aware of existing state laws
which granted preferential treatment to pregnant workers. 39 When
enacting the PDA, Congress did not expressly override or invalidate
such laws. 4° Further, Congress expressly endorsed the pre-Gilbert
EEOC guidelines for the treatment of pregnant workers. The guide-
lines specify that an employer violates Title VII if the employer fails
to provide adequate pregnancy leave and then fires an employee for
missing work due to a pregnancy disability.41 Endorsement of the
35. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 31, at 529.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (legislative history of the PDA).
38. See Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, Hearings
on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-177 (1977) (prevalent
practices of discrimination against preganant workers include: immediate termination upon
notice of pregnancy; stop-work policies requiring unpaid maternity leave to begin when
pregnancy is discovered; denial of health care benefits and sick leave pay for pregnancy
disability; pregnancy benefits conditioned on marital status; start-work policies prohibiting
return to work until weeks or months after delivery; loss of seniority upon return; and
conditional or no guaranteed reinstatement).
39. H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE CONo. &
Aumm. NEws 4749, 4754. States then including pregnancy in their fair employment laws
include: Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and Montana. Id.
40. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 693 (1987).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, supra note 39, at 2. The EEOC guidelines state:
Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth: Where the termination of
an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under
which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act [PDA]
if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business
necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1984).
340
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EEOC guidelines demonstrates Congressional approval of preferential
treatment for pregnant workers. Finally, Congress placed the PDA
in the definitional section of Title VII; thus, pregnancy discrimination
is included in the general Title VII prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation in treatment and effect. 42
The ambiguous wording of the PDA resulted in a split of authority
over the class of pregnant people protected by the PDA.43 In EEOC
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,44 the court narrowly interpreted
the PDA as preventing pregnancy discrimination solely against women
employees.45 Accordingly, health care plans denying pregnancy ben-
efits to the spouses of male employees did not violate the PDA.46 In
contrast, the court in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC,47 held that a health plan discriminating against spouses of
male employees in providing pregnancy benefits was in violation of
the PDA.4 a The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Newport News
decision, 49 and held that the health care plan of the employer dis-
criminated against men by conditioning the receipt of pregnancy
benefits on the sex of the employee.50 As interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, the PDA prevents employers from using
discriminatory classifications based on pregnancy regardless of em-
ployment status.5'
In Newport News, the Supreme Court directly addressed the rela-
tionship between the first and second clause of the PDA. The Court
held that the second clause, which provides for equal treatment of
pregnant workers, was not intended as a limitation on the first clause
which incorporates pregnancy within sex discrimination. 2 Rather, the
Court interpreted the second clause as one example of how pregnancy
discrimination could be remedied.53 The Court rejected the class
distinctions between pregnant and non-pregnant persons made in
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
43. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (comparison of conflicting cases inter-
preting the PDA).
44. 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 1246.
46. Id. at 1247.
47. 677 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982). See
generally Note, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 61 DET. J. URBAN
L. 663 (1984) (comprehensive analysis of the Newport News decision).
48. Newport News, 667 F.2d at 451.
49. 462 U.S. 676 (1983).
50. Id. at 683.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 678 n.14.
53. Id.
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Gilbert, choosing instead a test based on the Title VII prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sex. 54 In Newport News, the
test set forth to determine pregnancy discrimination is the same test
used to determine sex discrimination: A Title VII violation occurs
whenever an employee is treated in a way which, but for the sex of
the person, would be different.55 In adopting the sex discrimination
test, the Supreme Court determined that the second clause of the
PDA, requiring the same treatment for pregnant workers as given to
other workers, did not limit the remedy for pregnancy discrimination
to disparate treatment.56 Rather, the two clauses of the PDA are
intended to function together to prevent pregnancy discrimination in
both treatment and effect.
In Newport News, the Supreme Court defined the scope and
function of the PDA within the framework of Title VII. Newport
News also determined that pregnancy could be the basis of sex
discrimination against male workers, but only in the context of
discrimination against the pregnant spouses of male workers. The
question of whether preferential treatment of pregnant workers con-
stitutes sex discrimination against male workers remained unanswered
until California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.17
B. California Law
The state of California began regulating discriminatory employment
practices in 1959 with the passage of the Fair Employment Practices
Act.58 The Act barred employment discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. 9 The Act was revised
54. Id. at 685. In Newport News the Supreme Court stated:
The pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because
of her sex. And since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of the sex of the
employee, it follows inexorably that discrimination against female spouses in the
provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employees.
Id. at 684.
55. Id. at 683. See also Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711 n.21 (1978) (origin of the test for sex discrimination used in Newport News).
56. Newport News, 462 U.S. 676 at 678.
57. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). See Miller-Wohl Co.,
Inc. v. Commission of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1982). (Montana statute
granting preferential treatment to pregnant workers in disability and reinstatement benefits was
challenged as pre-empted by Title VII, case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
58. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. 1, at 1999 (enacting CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-1433
(West 1971)). See generally Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16 (historical analysis of California
fair employment law).
59. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. 1, at 2000 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 1412).
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and amended reaching its present form, the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), in 1977.60 The FEHA is administered by the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the Commission).6' The
Commission asserts broad remedial powers to enforce California fair
employment laws, including the power to hold hearings,6 2 issue in-
junctions, 63 and make precedential decisions6 granting reinstatement,
back pay, promotion, hiring, and compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 6
5
The Federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC)
which administers Title VII operates with comparatively less power. 66
The EEOC may either investigate claims and issue a right to sue
letter for private enforcement in federal court or take cases to court
directly. 67 Due to lack of resources, however, most cases are handled
through private action rather than directly by the EEOC.68
The California FEHA applies to a broader range of employers
than does Title VII. The FEHA applies to employers of five or
more, 69 labor organizations, 70 employment agencies, 7' state & civil
divisions and municipalities, 72 and permits prosecution of any person
who aids and abets another to violate the FEHA.73 In contrast, Title
VII applies to employers of fifteen or more and contains no express
provision regarding aiding and abetting.
74
Further, the California FEHA provides greater procedural flexi-
bility than Title VII. For example, the Commission substantively
60. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900- 12996 (vest 1980 & Supp. 1983).
61. Id. §§ 12901-12903 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
62. Id. at §§ 12967-12968 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983). See also, Administrative Procedure
Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11500-11529 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) (grants authority for the
Commission to hold hearings).
63. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12964 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
64. Id. § 12935(h) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
65. Id. § 12970(a) (vest 1980 & Supp. 1983).
66. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1981). Section 2000e-5(g) states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in... [the] unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice and order ... reinstatement
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.
Id. See also, Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 1065 n.80 (citing cases limiting the language
of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) to awards of back pay only).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1981).
68. Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 1058 n.21.
69. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(c) (Wvest 1980).
70. Id. § 12940(b) (vest 1980).
71. Id. § 12940(d) (West 1980).
72. Id. § 12926(c) (Vest 1980).
73. Id. § 12940(f) (West 1980).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1981).
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reviews the evidence as a whole in determining violations of the
FEHA.7- Under Title VII, a plaintiff must pursue either a disparate
treatment or disparate impact theory and must cope with complex
evidentiary requirements.
76
The California FEHA includes a prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of sex. 77 Section 12945 provides express protection against
pregnancy discrimination .7  Aware of the impending passage of the
PDA, the state legislature expressly exempted all portions of section
12945 from application to Title VII employers with the sole exception
of section 12945(b)(2). 79 Section 12945(b)(2) requires employers to
provide disability leave of up to four months for pregnant workers
and reinstatement to the same or similar position when the employee
is able to return to work.8
0
Section 12945(b)(2) is controversial because the provision requires
special treatment for pregnant workers. Even if an employer provides
no disability leave to other disabled workers an employer must
provide leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers.8 Under section
12945(b)(2), employers need only provide pregnancy leave for the
period of time, up to four months, of actual physical disability due
to pregnancy or related medical conditions. 82 Leave with pay is not
75. See Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 1070.
76. Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 1068. The procedural process of a Title VII case
was summarized as follows: Analysis of disparate treatment cases under Title VII usually
require plaintiff to show that plaintiff belonged to a protected group, applied for an unfilled
position, was qualified, was rejected and that the employer continued to seek applicants with
plaintiff's qualification. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
valid reasons for plaintiff's rejection. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff,
who retains the burden of persuasion throughout, must show a discriminatory reason motivated
the employer. Id. at 1068-69.
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(g) (West 1980). Section 12926(g) states: "As used in ...
connection with unlawful practices . . . 'on the basis' . . . refers to discrimination on the basis
of ... sex." Id.
78. Id. § 12945(b)(2). See supra note 2 (text of California Government Code section
12945(b)(2)).
79. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(e) (West 1980).
80. Id. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983). See supra notes 2-3 (text and interpretation
of California Government Code section 12945(b)(2)).
81. See supra notes 2-3 (text and interpretation of California Government Code section
12945(b)(2)).
82. Id. See also Note, California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Gilbert: The
State of California has Determined that Pregnancy May be Hazardous to Your Job, 16 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REv. 515, at 520 (1986) (explaining that employers must grant pregnancy leave
only when medically necessary). Pregnancy related medical conditions include: toxemia, high
blood pressure, placenta praevia caused by low implanation of the placenta, pre-birth separation
of the placenta, multiple births, diabetes, and surgical procedures such as ceasarian section.
Id. at 517 n.8.
344
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required by section 12945(b)(2) unless the employer provides paid
leave for other disabled workers.8
3
In structure and effect, section 12945(b)(2) differs from past ster-
eotypical legislation which assumed that all pregnant women were
unfit to work. 84 Past legislation excluded women from the workforce
by requiring mandatory maternity leave regardless of individual ca-
pacity to continue work. As job protection in the form of guaranteed
reinstatement was seldom available, mandatory maternity leave in
effect forced a women to choose between bearing a child and keeping
her job.85 Section 12945(b)(2) is structured to include women in the
workforce by providing leave on an individual basis and preserving
the jobs of those workers who find it medically necessary to discon-
tinue work.16
The PDA of Title VII clearly differs from section 12945(b)(2). The
PDA guarantees a pregnant worker cannot be treated less favorably
than other workers. If an employer provides no disability leave or
reinstatement to workers generally, however, pregnant workers are
not entitled to such benefits. Statistics project that women will make
up half the workforce in the United States by the year 1990,88 and
that 85% of working women will become pregnant at least once in
their working career.89 Thus, pregnancy is the main impediment to
women achieving equality in the workforce because employment
practices failing to offer affirmative job protection, in the event of
pregnancy, have a disparate impact on women as a class. Under
section 12945(b)(2), the state of California goes beyond Title VII by
83. Note, supra note 82, at 520.
84. See Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 334 (1985) (discussing 1952 United
States Labor Department recommendation of mandatory maternity leave for the protection of
pregnant workers and the states which adopted mandatory maternity leave legislation). See
also Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 CotuM. L. Rnv. 1118, 1123-24 (1986) (mandatory maternity leave unrelated to
desire or ability to work adversely affects job prospects of women).
85. See XVoMEN's BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTWENT OF LABOR,
BuLLTIN No. 240, MATERIrrY PROTECTON OF EMPLOYED WOMEN 7 (1952) (bulletin recom-
mended mandatory maternity leave policy to protect pregnant women, but admitted that such
a policy could cause a woman to lose her job). See also Williams, supra note 84, at 335
(discussion of United States Department of Labor mandatory maternity leave policy).
86. See Finley, supra note 84, at 1174 (discussion of how legislation can be structured to
include or exclude women from the workforce).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
88. Catalyst, Preliminary Report on a Nationwide Survey of Maternity/Paternity Leaves
(June 1984).
89. See Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94
YALE L.J. 929, 930 n.7 (1984) (sources of statistical data on the incidence of pregnancy among
working women).
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Cal. Fed. is a federally chartered savings and loan association
based in Los Angeles. 90 As an employer, Cal. Fed. is regulated by
both Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 196491 and the
California FEHA.92 Cal. Fed. provided a facially neutral 93 leave policy
which permitted employees to take unpaid leaves of absence for
disability and pregnancy. 94 Cal. Fed., however, reserved the right to
terminate any employee on leave, if a similar position was unavailable
when the employee was ready to return to work. 95
Lilian Garland was employed by Cal. Fed. as a receiptionist for
several years. 96 Garland applied for and was granted pregnancy
leave. 97 Four months later, Garland notified Cal. Fed. of her ability
to return to work. At that time, Garland was informed that her
position was filled and no similar jobs were available. 9 Garland filed
a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. 99
An accusation was issued by the Commission charging Cal. Fed.
with violating section 12945(b)(2).100 Section 12945(b)(2) requires em-
ployers to provide necessary disability leave of up to four months to
all pregnant employees and to reinstate the employee in the same or
90. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 687-88 (1987).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981).
92. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 12900-12996 (1980) (Fair Employment and Housing Act).
93. See BLACK'S LAW DIcToN~AY 305 (5th ed. 1983) (Facially netural means the wording
of a document shows no discriminatory intent or effect).
94. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
95. Id. (Cal. Fed. reserves the right to terminate an employee on leave of absence if a
similar position is unavailable).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Garland was reinstated by Cal. Fed. in a receptionist position in November of
1982, seven months after she gave notice of her ability to return to work. Id. at 688 n.7. The
action brought by Cal. Fed. against the Department of Fair Employment and Housing went
to trial on the issue of the validity of California Government Code section 12945(b)(2). Id. at
688.
99. Id. at 688.
100. Id. See supra notes 1-4 (text and background of California Government Code section
12945(b)(2)).
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similar position unless a position is no longer available due to business
necessity.' 0
Cal. Fed., joined by the Merchants and Manufacturers Association
and the California Chamber of Commerce, 0 2 responded to the ac-
cusation by bringing suit in federal district court against the Com-
mission 03 Cal. Fed. sought an injunction against the enforcement
of section 12945(b)(2) and a declaratory judgment that section
12945(b)(2) was inconsistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and, was therefore, preempted by Title VII.' 04 Cal. Fed.
argued that section 12945(b)(2) authorized preferential treatment for
pregnant workers, in violation of Title VII, because employers were
required to give leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers regard-
less of their policy toward disabled workers generally. 05 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Cal. Fed. The court
reasoned that preferential treatment of pregnant workers is discrim-
ination against males on the basis of pregnancy.1 06 On appeal, in a
highly critical opinion, the Court reversed the decision of the district
court and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission.107
The court held that Congress intended Title VII to provide, a
minimum level beneath which pregnancy benefits could not fall. 108
Further, although section 12945(b)(2) uses pregnancy as the basis for
different treatment, the court ruled such treatment consistent with
one of the goals of Title VII, that is, equal employment opportunity
for women. 0 9 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
and held the California law consistent with Title VII, and, therefore,
not federally pre-empted." 0
101. See supra note 3 (the Commission interprets California Government Code section
12945(b)(2) to include reinstatement of pregnant workers).
102. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 688. Merchants and Manufacturers
Association is a trade association that represents numerous employers within California. Id.
at 688 n.8. The California Chamber of Commerce also represents many California businesses.
Id. Both the Chamber of Commerce and Merchants and Manufacturers Association have
members with disability leave policies similar to Cal. Fed. Id. at 688.
103. Id. at 688.
104. Id.
105. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
107 S.Ct. 683 (1987). See generally Note, supra note 82 (analysis of the Ninth Circuit decision).
106. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
107. Id. To illustrate, the appellate court noted: "The district court's decision that section
12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense, misin-
terprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA." Id. at 396.
108. Id. at 396.
109. Id.
110. CaL Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 695.
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B. The Opinion
Justice Marshall authored the majority opinion."' The Supreme
Court first determined that federal pre-emption is based solely on
Congressional intent." 2 Next, the Court found that in creating Title
VII, Congress had no intent to categorically pre-empt the field of
employment discrimination law to the exclusion of the states."'
Rather, Congress intended pre-emption to occur only when state law
is in direct conflict with federal law, or when compliance with state
law would defeat the purpose of Title VII." 4 The Supreme Court
found that Congress attached great importance to state antidiscri-
mination laws in achieving the goals of Title VII.' 5
By analyzing the legislative history of the PDA," 6 the Court
identified the purpose of the PDA: to prevent discrimination against
pregnant workers, thereby promoting equal employment opportunity
for women." 7 Because section 12945(b)(2)" 8 shares the same goal,
the Supreme Court found that section 12945(b)(2) was not in conflict
with the PDA.1"9 The Court, therefore, concluded that Title VII does
not pre-empt section 12945(b)(2). 20
111. Id. at 686 (6-3 decision, Brennen, J., Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., O'Connor, J.,
Marshall, J., majority; Scalia, J., concurring; White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Powell, J.).
112. Id. at 689.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 690. The Court cited Title VII section 708 which contemplates an interlocking
system of state and federal protection where state anti-discrimination laws are valid unless the
state law requires or permits an act which is illegal under Title VII. Id. Title VII section 708
states in relevant part:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1981). The Court also cited Title XI section 1104 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which directly addresses the intent of Congress on the issue of pre-emption:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent
on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this
Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, [Title VIII or any provision
thereof.
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 690 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000h- 4 (1981)).
115. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 690.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
117. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
118. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
119. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
120. Id. at 695.
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The Supreme Court, interpreted the language of the PDA in the
light of the legislative history and historical context from which it
evolved.' 2 1 Congress created the PDA in reaction to the General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert decision. 122 The second clause of the PDA
expressly provides for equal treatment of pregnant workers in the
receipt of fringe benefits, which was the issue before the court in
Gilbert.2 1 Congress, however, placed the PDA within the definition
of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes, thus, the PDA functions
within general Title VII prohibitions against discrimination on the
basis of gender. 24
The Supreme Court noted that the legislative history of the PDA
contains a thorough account of discrimination against pregnant work-
ers.'25 The history also shows that laws providing preferential treat-
ment existed in a number of states. 126 The Supreme Court
acknowledged clear statements in the legislative history, that Congress
did not intend to require employers to provide preferential treatment
for pregnant workers under the PDA. 127 Despite these statements,
the Court found no Congressional intent to prohibit the states from
providing preferential treatment for pregnant workers .128 State pref-
erential treatment laws, the Court reasoned, are consistent with the
goal of ending discrimination against pregnant workers. 129 As a result,
under the PDA, Title VII employers are not required to implement
new benefit programs for pregnant workers, but the states are free
to mandate Title VII employers adopt preferential benefit pro-
grams.10
Theoretically, the possibility exists for an employer in California
to comply with both section 12945(b)(2) and the exact language of
the PDA by providing all workers with disability leave and reinstate-
121. Id. at 691. Justice Marshall stated:
We must examine the PDA's language against the background of its legislative
history and historical context ... 'it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statutue, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.' (citations omitted).
Id.
122. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
123. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 687-89.
126. Id. at 692.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 692-93.
129. Id. at 693-94.
130. Id. at 692-93.
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ment.13 ' To the majority, the fact that an employer could theoretically
comply with both the state and federal statutes is proof that the two
statutes do not conflict, and thus, Title VII does not pre-empt section
12945(b)(2). 32 The Supreme Court noted that Title VII, however,
cannot be the basis for reverse discrimination suits to force employers
to offer co-extensive state and federal benefits to all workers. 33 Using
Title VII to extend state preferential benefits to other workers is a
remedial device implemented to resolve conflicts between state and
federal law. 134 In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra, however, no conflict exists between the state and federal
law, so no remedial action is necessary or possible. 35 Title VII
employers who are required to implement preferential benefit pro-
grams for pregnant workers under state law are, thus, protected from
potential Title VII actions by workers who are not granted similar
benefits.' 36
III. RAMIFICATIONS
In California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, the
United States Supreme Court held that the PDA of Title VII and
section 12945(b)(2) share the common goal of ending discrimination
against pregnant workers. 37 Title VII, therefore, did not pre-empt a
California state law which provides preferential treatment for a
traditionally disadvantaged class, pregnant workers. 38 A broad read-
ing of the holding of the Court approves state action that enforces
the goals of federal civil right legislation, even regulation granting
broader and more specific protections than federal law. The impli-
cations of a broad reading could result in other disadvantaged classes
seeking preferential treament under state law without the fear of
reverse discrimination suits by members of the advantaged class.139
131. Id. at 695.
132. Id.
133. Id. The dissent reasoned that finding California Government Code section 12945(b)(2)
consistent with the PDA meant Title VII requires extension of disability leave and reinstatement
benefits to all workers. Id. at 701.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 695 n.31.
136. Id. at 695.
137. Id. at 694.
138. Id.
139. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 31, at 553-55 (analysis of the Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 432 U.S. 265 (1978)) decision and the implications of
preferential treatment in the area of affirmative action).
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Thus, the ability of the states to combat all forms of discrimination
covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is enhanced.'
4°
Conversely, a narrow reading of California Federal Savings &
Loan Association could restrict the holding to the facts. The issue
in California Federal Savings & Loan Association is the specific
meaning, purpose, and scope of the PDA, and the relationship
between the PDA and state laws seeking to end discrimination against
pregnant workers. 41 A narrow reading, therefore, might result in
limiting state laws granting preferential treatment for a disadvantaged
class to the area of pregnancy discrimination.
California Federal Savings & Loan Association clarifies the in-
tended scope of the PDA. The Supreme Court held that the second
clause of the PDA is not a limitation on the first clause. 42 As a
result, the reasoning of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert'43 is no longer
valid. The PDA is intended to prevent employers from using classi-
fications on the basis of pregnancy which disadvantage women as a
class. '
Finally, in California Federal Savings & Loan Association, equal
opportunity of employment for women does not mean that women
must be treated the same as men in the area of pregnancy disability
where the sexes are inherently different. 45 The holding of the Supreme
Court attempts to resolve a controversy which exists in the legal
community. Known as the equal treatment/special treatment debate,
the conflict centers around the meaning of equality of the sexes.
4
The equal treatment or same treatment side of the debate takes
the position that equality of the sexes is equality in the treatment of
men and women. Women and men must be treated the same becaus.e
140. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 690 (emphasizing the importance Congress
attaches to state antidiscrimination law in achieving goals of civil rights legislation).
141. See supra notes 111-36 and accompanying text (analysis of the California Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra opinion).
142. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107, S. Ct. at 691.
143. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
144. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 692.
145. Id. at 694 (pregnancy should be taken into account in creating employment policies
and legislation).
146. See generally Kreiger & Cooney, supra note 31, at 513-72 (detailed analysis of the
equal treatment/special treatment controversy and various theoretical models of sexual equality
underlying the different positions); Note, supra note 31, at 929-56 (advocating special treatment
to accommodate pregnancy). But see Williams, supra note 84, at 325 (supports equal treatment
approach); Finley, supra note 84, at 1121-22 (criticizing both equal treatment and special
treatment approaches as fundamentally flawed because built around male norms; commentater
advocates re-examination of basic societal values which have separated the world of work
from the world of the home, and adoption of a responsible position which recognizes the
interdependency of both spheres and fosters interaction between both spheres).
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stigmatic discrimination is an inherent danger in gender based clas-
sifications. 147 By emphasizing the commonalities between men and
women, the equal treatment approach hopes to overcome the as-
sumption that pregnancy is a woman's problem. The traditional
equality model treats similarly situated individuals alike, and doing
so in the pregnancy context lessens the danger of biases and stereo-
types becoming the basis of employment decisions . 4  Further, in the
past, laws treating preganant women differently than men "pro-
tected" women right out of their jobs. 149 Treating both sexes the
same and working for disability benefits and reinstatement for all
workers is the solution urged by the equal treatment approach.
The special treatment approach advocates that equality of the sexes
is equality in effect. True equality is obtained when legislation places
women and men on equal footing in the workforceY5 0 Special treat-
ment laws take into account the differences between the sexes and
provide for those differences accordingly.' The same treatment
approach is criticized because it provides only as much protection
for women as is granted to their male counterparts. If an employer
fails to provide disability benefits or reinstatement to other tempo-
rarily disabled workers no benefits need to be provided to pregnant
workers. The need for pregnancy benefits and job protection is
apparent given that eighty-five percent of the women in the workforce
will become pregnant at least once in their working career. 52 Thus,
the special treatment approach advocates immediate legislative pro-
tection for pregnant workers, reasoning that similar benefits can be
extended to all workers as society begins to recognize the interde-
pendancy of the home and work environment.'53 Preferential treat-
147. See Note, supra note 82, at 517 n. 11 (the National Organization for Women (NOW),
the League of Women Voters and the National Women's Political Caucus support equal
treatment approach).
148. See Finley, supra note 84, at .1146 (summarizes the equal treatment position).
149. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (justifies the exclusion of a woman
from the legal profession asserting "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."). See
also Finley, supra note 84, at 1174 (examples of protective legislation, restrictions on the hours
or times women can work, height and weight restrictions, lifting restrictions, all designed to
exclude women from the workforce, especially when pregnant).
150. See Note, supra note 82, at 517 n.12 (California Women Lawyers, and Equal Rights
Advocates, among others, support special treatment approach).
151. See also Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 694 (1987) (discussion
of the need to take pregnancy into account in fashioning legislation to end sex discrimination).
152. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussion of statistical data on the
likelihood of pregnancy among women in the workforce).
153. Finley, supra note 84 at 1174-75 (discussion of the need for immediate legislation for
pregnant workers while working toward social change).
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ment provides needed protection which seeks to include women in
the workforce, as distinguished from past stereotypical legislation
which aimed at forcing women out of the workforce. 154 The California
Federal Savings & Loan Association decision supports special treat-
ment for pregnant workers as a remedy for past discrimination and
as a means to effectively advance the equality of the sexes in the
workplace. 55
CONCLUSION
Title VII and the PDA do not provide affirmative federal rights
to pregnant workers. The California Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation decision upholds the ability of states to provide an affirmative
remedy for past discrimination against pregnant workers in the form
of preferential treatment in disability leave and reinstatement benefits.
As a result of California Federal Savings & Loan Association Title
VII employers in California must provide disability leave and job
protection for pregnant workers regardless of their policy toward
disabled workers generally. Employers providing preferential benefits
to pregnant workers in accordance with state law are protected from
reverse discrimination suits under Title VII by disabled workers not
so preferred. Finally, the greater ease and flexibility of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act procedures over those of Title VII,
should result in more employment discrimination grievances resolved
under state law, thus, strengthening an already formidable tool for
enforcing equal opportunity of employment in California.
N. Erin Rose Brewer
154. Id. at 1174.
155. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 694-95.

